An attempt by the Zelensky regime to resume offensive operations in the Nikolaev-Krivoy Rog and other directions failed, Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Lieutenant General Igor Konashenkov said on August 31.
Defeat and score: Ukrainian troops lost more than a thousand soldiers per day
The greatest damage was inflicted on them in the Kherson direction
For two days in Nikolaev-Krivoy Rog and other areas, Ukrainian troops lost four combat aircraft: two Su-25s, one Su-24, one MiG-29, and three Mi-8 helicopters. Russian troops destroyed 63 Ukrainian tanks, 59 infantry fighting vehicles, 48 other armored fighting vehicles, 14 pickup trucks with heavy machine guns and more than 1,700 nationalists, he said.
“Ukrainian troops have already made two major offensive attempts, on August 30 three battalion tactical groups participated in them, on the 30th – two, but they could not achieve much success, the AFU suffer heavy losses. Apparently, they have the task of gaining a foothold at least in some settlement, so that other battalion tactical groups will then be pulled up to it, ”military expert Alexei Leonkov told Izvestia.
Today, the VFU continues to look for vulnerable points where they could organize some kind of breakthrough of the front line near Kherson, the expert explained.
“At the same time, they probably still have strategic reserves. Now they operate on tanks supplied from Eastern Europe. They managed to disguise some of these tanks and transport them closer to the combat area, so their grouping was not destroyed in their bases, ”concluded Alexei Leonkov.
According to him, two days of unsuccessful attempts to break through the line of contact suggest that the enemy probably did not want to “do something serious” in the area.
This, Leonkov clarified, “is evidenced by actions from three directions, and not the choice of one for a decisive blow. Sufficiently powerful fire training, which is necessary before an attack on such a wide front, is also not observed.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.